Electoral competition in Europe’s new tripolar political space : class voting for the left, centre-right and radical right by OESCH, Daniel & RENNWALD, Line
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author Author and Author Author  
MWP 2017/02 
Max Weber Programme 
 
Electoral Competition in Europe’s New Tripolar 
Political Space: Class Voting for the Left, Centre-Right 
and Radical Right 
 
 
Daniel Oesch and Line Rennwald 
 
 
  
 
  
  European University Institute 
Max Weber Programme 
 
 
Electoral Competition in Europe’s New Tripolar Political Space: 
Class Voting for the Left, Centre-Right and Radical Right 
 
 
Daniel Oesch and Line Rennwald 
 
EUI Working Paper MWP 2017/02 
 
 
 
 
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. 
 
 
ISSN 1830-7728 
 
© Daniel Oesch and Line Rennwald, 2017 
Printed in Italy 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Abstract 
In a growing number of countries, the two dominant political poles of the 20th century, the parties of 
the Left and the Centre-Right, are challenged by a third pole made up by the Radical Right. Between 
2000 and 2015, the Radical Right has obtained more than 12 per cent of the vote in over ten Western 
European countries and in over twenty national elections. We argue that the three poles compete with 
each other for the allegiance of different social classes. Our analysis shows the micro-foundations of 
class voting in nine West European countries where the political space was tripolar for part – or all – 
of the period between 2000 and 2015. Based on the European Social Survey 2002-2014, we find that 
socio-cultural professionals still form the party preserve of the Left, and large employers and 
managers constitute the party preserve of the Centre-Right. However, the Radical Right competes with 
the Centre-Right for the votes of small business owners, and it challenges the Left over its traditional 
working-class stronghold. These two contested strongholds attest to the coexistence of old and new 
patterns of class voting. The analysis of voters’ attitudes shows that old patterns are structured by the 
economic axis of conflict: production workers’ support for the Left and small business owners’ 
endorsement of the Centre-Right. In contrast, new patterns are linked to the rise of the Radical Right 
and structured by the cultural axis of conflict: the support for the Radical Right by production workers 
and small business owners.  
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 1 
Introduction 
The electoral rise of Radical Right-wing parties has led to the formation of three political poles of 
increasingly similar size in Western Europe. In a growing number of countries, the two dominant 
poles of the 20th century, the political parties of the Left and the Centre-Right, are challenged by a 
third pole made up by the Radical Right. This emergence of a tripolar political space has accompanied 
the electoral decline of the mainstream parties of the Left and the Right – the Social Democrats and 
Christian Democrats (Martin, 2013). While the political space had crystallized into a clear triangular 
configuration by 2000 in a few countries only, most notably in France (Grunberg & Schweisguth, 
2003; Bornschier & Lachat, 2009), it quickly became the rule rather than the exception across Western 
Europe by 2016.  
The argument of a tripolar political space is not new. It has been applied to party families’ 
ideologies (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2006; Kriesi et al., 2008) and voters’ attitudes (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2008; 
Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). We develop this argument further by uncovering the underlying 
structural basis for this tripolar division. We argue that, in the tripolar political space, the three poles 
are in competition with each other over different occupational segments of the electorate. The Left 
competes with the Radical Right for the support of the working class, notably production workers, 
whereas the Centre-Right competes with the Radical Right for the votes of the old middle class, made 
up of small business owners. In turn, the Left and the Centre-Right are in competition for the support 
of the growing salaried middle class. The rise of the Radical Right has thus not only shifted electoral 
competition from a bipolar to a tripolar setting, but has also triggered a process of realignment 
between socio-demographic groups and political parties and thereby led to a renaissance of class 
voting (Rydgren, 2013).  
A tripolar configuration presupposes that there are at least two dimensions of political conflict. 
A first economic dimension separates the mainstream left from the mainstream right, whereas a second 
cultural dimension pits the Radical Right against both the established Left and Right (Kitschelt, 1994). 
Our ambition is to locate occupational classes in this two-dimensional space and thus to draw the 
socio-structural map of electoral competition between the three party blocs.  
We focus on the political demand-side of voters and analyse the micro-foundations of 
electoral competition for nine West European countries where the political space was tripolar for part 
– or all – of the period between 2000 and 2015: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. We consider a political space to be tripolar if each of 
the three poles, and notably the Radical Right, obtains more than 12 per cent of the national vote. This 
was the case for over 20 national elections between 2000 and 2015. Our empirical analysis takes full 
advantage of the European Social Survey by merging the survey’s seven rounds, from 2002 to 2014, 
into a single dataset. 
Our paper first develops a model that shows how parties compete for classes in the tripolar 
political space. We then define the party poles, present the three poles’ electoral size, and discuss our 
measures for class and attitudes. We then provide empirical results on class voting and show the extent 
to which the class effect is mediated by differences in voters’ economic and cultural attitudes. The 
conclusion summarizes our main findings.  
 
 
Parties in the tripolar political space 
A political system can only accommodate three different poles if it is based on at least two 
dimensions. Several authors argue, theoretically and empirically, that voters’ preferences are 
structured along two axes (Bornschier, 2010; Hooghe et al. 2002; Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2008). 
A first economic axis goes from a socialist to a capitalist end and plots supporters of income 
redistribution against supporters of free market solutions. A second cultural axis relates to the politics 
of identity and runs from a libertarian to a traditional end. While the first axis is about materialist 
needs and the market, the second is about belonging to a community.  
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We argue that three party blocs can usefully be distinguished within this political space, based 
on parties’ ideology (Mair & Mudde, 1998): the Left, the Centre-Right and the Radical Right. Parties 
of the Left include Social Democrats, Communists, Greens and the New Left, which combine an 
economic position in favour of a strong welfare state with a culturally liberal stance on migration and 
multiculturalism. Parties of the Centre-Right comprise Christian Democrats, Liberals and 
Conservatives, which oppose the Left over state intervention into the economy, but share – although 
less fervently – the Left’s liberal stance on cultural issues. The Radical Right includes right-wing 
populist parties for whom the economic axis is of subordinate importance (Mudde, 2007), as they 
abandoned their initial neoliberal stance of the 1980s (De Lange, 2007; Kitschelt, 2013) and blurred 
their socio-economic positions in order to attract broader support (Afonso, 2015; Rovny, 2013). What 
sets the Radical Right apart as a third pole is its challenge of both the Left and the Centre-Right over 
cultural issues by strongly opposing immigration, multiculturalism and European integration. 
The classification of party families into three poles may meet with three objections. A first 
concern is that it lumps together very different party families. We argue that the litmus test for the 
three poles is whether parties of a given pole share a common ideological basis which makes them 
natural coalition partners for government formation. This seems to be the case for Social-Democrats, 
Greens and Communists on the Left, as well as for Christian Democrats, Liberals and Conservatives 
on the Centre-Right. In contrast, grand coalitions between the left and the right are the exception, and 
the participation of Radical Right parties in government even more exceptional – “a rarity in Western 
Europe” (Mudde, 2013: 5). 
A second objection is that the Radical Right simply expands the right-wing bloc (Bale, 2003), 
and is thus best seen within the unidimensional Left-right opposition of parties (Van Der Brug & Van 
Spanje, 2009). Our reading of the literature’s empirical evidence disagrees with this argument. While 
the triangular party competition has been shown most clearly in France (Bornschier & Lachat, 2009; 
Gougou & Labouret, 2013; Grunberg & Schweisguth, 2003), more recent evidence for the 2000s 
based on media-content data (Kriesi, 2012) and expert surveys on parties (Cochrane, 2013) points to 
tripartition in an increasing number of West European countries. The rise of the New Left has resulted 
in a rapprochement on cultural issues within the left between Social Democrats and Green parties. In 
contrast, the rise of the Radical Right has led to a split within the right between the economically and 
culturally liberal Centre-Right and the culturally traditional Radical Right (Cochrane, 2013; Kriesi et 
al., 2015: 3).  
A third objection considers the Radical Right to be too small to constitute a pole in its own 
right. While we provide evidence on this issue in the results section, a brief look at electoral scores 
helps us to discard the argument at this stage. Between 2000 and 2015, parties of the Radical Right 
obtained more than 22 per cent of the popular vote in two or more national elections in Austria, 
Norway and Switzerland – and more than 15 per cent in two national elections in Finland, France and 
the Netherlands. Clearly, we do not deal here with small and short-lived protest parties. In the period 
since 2010, clear examples of political tripartition are found – besides in France – in small, affluent 
West European countries such as Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
Switzerland.  
In parallel to the rise of the Radical Right, we observe the electoral decline of the mainstream 
parties of the left and right. Averaged over 15 West European countries, Social Democrats received 
the constant support of 30 per cent of voters between 1945 and 1980, before seeing their electoral 
share fall to 28 per cent in 1991-2000 and to 25 per cent in 2006-2010 (Martin, 2013: 544). Likewise, 
Christian Democrats saw their proportion of the national vote drop from 23 per cent in the 1950s to 20 
per cent in the 1970s and to 14 per cent in 2006-2010 (Martin, 2013: 544). In parallel, the largest gains 
since 1990 were made by the Radical Right. While it is the smallest pole in the triangular political 
space, it is by no means insignificant. On the contrary, a look at recent elections in Germany (AfD) or 
the UK (UKIP) suggests that its electoral catch-up process in Europe is still under way.  
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Voters and classes in the tripolar political space 
The rise of the Radical Right has not only been the decisive impetus for the formation of a third pole 
and hence of a tripolar party space. It has also contributed – together with the rise of the New Left and 
Green parties a decade earlier – to a process of electoral realignment where old ties between classes 
and parties have loosened and been replaced by new ties. Electoral competition in the tripolar space is 
thus not a mere conflict over values, it is also anchored in the occupational structure. The three poles 
compete for the votes of different classes and, given the right analytical tools, the micro-foundations 
of this new form of class voting should clearly emerge.  
We begin by clarifying the concept of class voting, which we define as the presence of 
systematic links between voters’ class location – their position in the labour market – and the parties 
they support. Which classes relate to which parties is then an empirical question, with workers voting 
for the Left being just one instance of class voting (e.g. Evans, 2000, Oesch 2008a). Furthermore, we 
argue that voters’ class positions may affect both their economic and cultural attitudes. In their jobs, 
people do not only make a living, but are also exposed to experiences of autonomy and control, and to 
a specific set of social interactions with superiors, colleagues, clients, patients, or pupils. These work 
experiences likely contribute to shaping voters’ values on both economic and cultural issues – and 
may result in systematic differences in class voting (Kitschelt, 2010: 666; Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014: 9-
10; Oesch, 2013: 32).  
Of course, individuals’ identities are not only forged by their class position, but also by 
religion, language or nationality. Party choice is then determined by the identity that is most salient – 
and depends on parties’ efforts to articulate different identities and mobilize around particular conflicts 
(Bornschier, 2010: 58-59).  
In order to draw the map of class voting in the tripolar political space, we distinguish three 
types of relationship that link classes to the party poles: (i) some classes are the preserve of one 
particular pole; (ii) some classes are the contested stronghold of two different poles; (iii) all three 
poles are in open competition over some classes. In a party preserve, one sole party pole receives 
above-average electoral support from a class, whereas the two other poles obtain below-average 
support from the same class. In a contested stronghold, two party poles receive above-average 
electoral support from a class, and the last pole receives below-average support from the same class. In 
open competition, none of the three poles receives above- or below-average electoral support from a 
class.  
These three types of relationship provide a useful tool to grasp both breaks and continuities in 
class voting and to accommodate situations in which party dominance over one class has weakened 
without completely disappearing. Depending on the countries studied, research on class voting shows 
the resilience of traditional forms of class voting (Evans & Tilley, 2012a; Rennwald & Evans, 2014) 
or emphasizes the emergence of new patterns of class voting (e.g. Ivarsflaten, 2005; Oesch, 2013). 
We argue that the two traditional party blocs of the Left and the Centre-Right each keep one 
class as its preserve: the Left is the uncontested champion of professionals in health care, education, 
social welfare and the media (henceforth: socio-cultural professionals), whereas the Centre-Right 
benefits from the strong endorsement of large employers, managers and liberal professionals. The two 
mainstream poles are challenged by the Radical Right over two of their traditional strongholds: the 
Left faces strong competition over the working class, while the Centre-Right struggles to keep the 
votes of the old middle class of small business owners. Finally, there is open competition between the 
three poles for the votes of two classes, technical professionals and technicians (henceforth: technical 
specialists) as well as office clerks (such as secretaries and receptionists).  
Our model is shown in Figure 1 and locates the position of party poles and classes within the 
two-dimensional political space. This model thus depicts how we expect the electoral competition over 
a given class to play out. We begin with liberal professionals, large employers and managers. Their 
privileged location within the class structure not only leads them to adopt market-liberal economic 
preferences, but also leaves them undaunted by globalization, immigration and multiculturalism. 
Given their preferences for market solutions and cultural liberalism, the Centre-Right should be in a 
clear pole position for the vote of these classes.  
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In contrast, socio-cultural professionals mostly work as wage-earners in the public sector and 
likely favour a strong welfare state and income redistribution (Gingrich & Häusermann, 2015). More 
importantly, as their work process consists mainly of social interactions – teaching, nursing, 
counselling – and requires tolerance for cultural diversity, they should have markedly libertarian 
cultural preferences (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014: 6-7; Kriesi, 1998: 169). Ever since the rise of the new 
social movements that mobilized around post-materialist issues in the 1970s and 1980s (Kriesi, 1989), 
socio-cultural professionals should be the preserve of the Left.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
While the rise of the Radical Right has by no means challenged the Left’s predominance among socio-
cultural professionals, it has led to a bitter contest over the traditional leftist stronghold of the working 
class, notably production workers. The latter were not only hit by de-industrialization, mass 
unemployment and trade union decline, but also often lost out in the economic reforms of Third Way 
social democratic governments (Arndt, 2013). Not surprisingly, they do not share in the Third Way 
optimism about the knowledge society (Betz & Meret, 2013). The waning conflict over the economy 
between the mainstream left and right has thus opened a highway for the Radical Right to attract the 
working-class vote over cultural issues. All the more so as the traditional left further alienated its blue-
collar basis by following the New Left and adopting increasingly libertarian cultural positions. In this 
context, the Radical Right has made belonging to the national community an attractive identity. By 
upholding national sovereignty against disappearing borders and defending local traditions against 
multiculturalism, it has become a powerful contender for the working-class vote (Bornschier, 2010; 
De Lange, 2007; Oesch, 2008b)  
The Radical Right does not only challenge the Left over the working-class vote, but also the 
Centre-Right over its traditional stronghold of small business owners. Economically, these two classes 
form an uneasy alliance: the working class is pro-redistribution and small business owners are pro-
business (Ivarsflaten, 2005). However, they share similar preferences on cultural issues. The Radical 
Right’s resistance to open borders and multiculturalism also strikes a chord with small business 
owners (Kriesi et al., 2008); while their economic preferences move them towards the Centre-Right, 
their cultural attitudes lead them to support the Radical Right. 
Our model expects limited competition for the classes that are party preserves, and a two-way 
competition for the contested strongholds. In contrast, electoral competition is likely to be very open 
for two classes whose occupational location puts them close to the median voter: technical specialists 
and office clerks. The former require higher levels of education, earn above-average wages and are 
less vulnerable to technological change. Accordingly, they may be somewhat more market-liberal and 
culturally libertarian than clerks. Still, for these two classes, we do not expect any party pole to have a 
decisive advantage over the two others. 
 
 
Hypotheses on class voting 
This overview allows us to summarize our hypotheses about the micro-foundations of the electoral 
competition in the tripolar political space.  
First, with respect to party preserves, we expect socio-cultural professionals to 
disproportionately vote for the Left, and to do so based on their cultural preferences (H1). Likewise, 
we expect managers to disproportionately vote for the Centre-Right, and to do so based on their 
economic preferences (H2). 
Second, with respect to contested strongholds, we expect the working class, and notably 
production workers, to split their vote between the Left (based on their economic preferences), and the 
Radical Right (based on their cultural preferences) (H3). Likewise, we expect small business owners 
to split their vote between the Centre-Right (based on their economic preferences) and the Radical 
Right (based on their cultural preferences) (H4).   
Third, in a temporal perspective, we expect the electoral rise of the Radical Right to have no 
influence on the two party preserves – socio-cultural professionals (and their vote for the Left) and 
Electoral Competition in Europe’s New Tripolar Political Space 
 
European University Institute 5 
managers (and their vote of the Centre-Right) (H5) –, but to accompany growing support in the two 
contested strongholds – production workers (at the cost of the Left) and small business owners (at the 
cost of the Centre-Right) (H6).  
 
 
Definition of party poles, data and measures 
 
Definition of party poles 
We define party poles on the basis of parties’ ideology and limit our analysis to Western Europe. 
While the attribution of parties to the Left and, to a lesser extent, to the Centre-Right seems 
straightforward, the situation is more ambiguous for parties of the Radical Right. We define the 
Radical Right as a broad political family which shares a common ideology based on nativism, 
authoritarianism and populism (Mudde, 2013: 3). This encompassing definition leads us to include 
parties that display very different historical trajectories: former traditional Centre-Right parties such as 
the Swiss People’s Party and the Austrian Freedom Party (during its liberal period in the early 1980s), 
former anti-tax movements such as the Danish People’s Party and the Norwegian Progress Party, 
extreme-right parties such as the French National Front and Flemish Vlaams Belang, newcomers with 
a strong nationalist-populist profile such as the Dutch Freedom Party, the Finns Party and the Sweden 
Democrats.1 
We consider parties to form a pole if they obtained at least 12 per cent of the votes in a 
national election over the period 2000-2015. Reaching between 10 to 15 per cent of the votes 
constitutes an important threshold for emerging parties, such as those of the Radical Right. If a Radical 
Right party reaches this threshold, it acquires real electoral weight and makes the government 
formation by a mainstream left or right party bloc much harder – we then observe a tripolar 
configuration. But of course, the criterion of 12 per cent is somewhat arbitrary; we choose it for 
pragmatic reasons because it is both restrictive and flexible enough to analyse the Radical Right – a 
threshold of 15 per cent would exclude too many elections, while 10 per cent would be too inclusive. 
Over the period under study, the 12 per cent mark is systematically surpassed by the Left and the 
Centre-Right in Western Europe. In contrast, the radical right pole only emerges in some countries and 
elections. Table A.1 in the appendix shows the parties that we consider belonging to the Radical Right 
and their scores in all the national elections between 2000 and 2015.  
 
The electoral size of the three party poles 
The formation of a tripolar political space largely depends on the Radical Right and its capacity to 
attract enough voters to constitute a third party pole. The West European countries with a sizeable 
Radical Right pole can be divided into two groups. In a first group, the Radical Right was solidly 
established over the entire period between 2000 and 2015, and includes Austria, Denmark, France, 
Norway, Switzerland and, with more fluctuations, Belgium and the Netherlands. In a second group, 
the Radical Right has made its breakthrough more recently and only emerged as a third pole after 
2010. This applies to Finland and Sweden as well as to Greece and the United Kingdom, two countries 
not covered by our data and hence excluded from the analysis.2 In a last group, the Radical Right is 
either absent, insignificant, (still) too small to be considered a third pole or it made its national break-
through after 2015. This is the case of Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain as well as 
the more ambiguous case of Italy (not taking into account the populist Five Star Movement at the 2013 
                                                      
1 Several parties are difficult to classify. We attribute the short-lived List Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands to the Radical Right 
pole, but neither the National Alliance nor the Forza Italia/People of Freedom in Italy (see Bobba & McDonnell, 2015: 
165). We do not count the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) as Radical Right, its separatist agenda making it an outlier. In 
order to include all parties in a given country, the radical-right pole also comprises neo-Nazi and neo-fascist parties. 
However, with the exception of Greece, these parties do not form the basis of a sizeable radical-right pole.  In the past, 
parties that did not take their distance with their Nazi or fascist heritage were less likely to succeed (Ignazi, 2003). 
2 For Greece, the relevant rounds of the ESS are missing. For the United Kingdom, the electoral breakthrough of UKIP took 
place in 2015 and thus after the last available ESS round.  
Daniel Oesch and Line Rennwald  
6 Max Weber Programme Working Papers 
general election). Table A.2 in the appendix shows the electoral strength of the Radical Right across 
Western Europe between 2000 and 2015. 
In order to gauge the size of the Radical Right pole relative to the other poles, we attribute 
(almost) all parties to one of the three poles.3 The Left includes the Socialist, Social Democratic and 
Labour parties, as well as Green parties, Communist parties and radical Left parties. The Centre-Right 
includes the Conservative, Christian Democratic, Centre and Liberal parties.4 Figure 2 presents the 
electoral strength of these three poles, averaged over the most recent period from 2010 to 2015. We 
observe the clearest tripolar configuration of the party system in Austria and Switzerland where the 
Radical Right pole attracts a quarter of the electorate. In Denmark, Finland, France, and Norway, the 
Radical Right pole receives between 15 and 20 per cent of the vote. In Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Sweden the Radical Right barely obtains 12 per cent of votes and clearly constitutes a smaller pole 
than the Left or the Centre-Right. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Data and measures 
Our analysis of class voting is set at the individual level and based on data from the European Social 
Survey (ESS). The ESS has been collected biennially since 2002, and we merge the seven available 
rounds between 2002 and 2014 into a single dataset. Our sample includes only those countries and 
elections when all three poles – and notably the Radical Right – obtained at least 12 per cent of votes. 
Therefore, we include all seven rounds for Denmark, Norway and Switzerland, but one single round 
for Sweden (2014, when the Sweden Democrats received 12.9 per cent of the national vote). Based on 
this criterion, our sample includes data from nine countries, and between one to seven ESS rounds per 
country: Austria (4 rounds), Belgium (3), Denmark (7), Finland (2), France (5), Netherlands (2), 
Norway (7), Sweden (1), Switzerland (7).  
 
Measures 
In the ESS, respondents are asked what party they voted for in the last national parliamentary election. 
This question provides us with the dependent variable: party choice grouped into three poles, Left, 
Centre-Right, Radical Right.5 We correct for the underrepresentation of Radical Right voters in the 
ESS by constructing individual-level weights that adjust our data for the official score that each pole 
received in the national election, corresponding to a given ESS round. We apply these weights as well 
as the ESS design weights to all our analyses.   
Our key independent variable is voters’ class position – their location within the labour market 
– which we measure with a detailed class schema based on two dimensions (Oesch 2006, 2013). A 
first dimension distinguishes hierarchically between more or less advantageous employment 
relationships based on people’s marketable skills, whereas as a second dimension discriminates 
horizontally between different work logics.  
The combination of the two dimensions leads to the 8-class schema shown in table A.3 in the 
appendix. This schema allows us to identify three classes belonging to the salaried middle class: (1) 
managers such as personnel managers, accountants and administrators; (2) technical specialists such as 
                                                      
3 A few parties were not attributed to any pole, notably some regionalist parties (e.g. the SNP in Scotland), very religious 
parties (e.g. the SGP in the Netherlands or the EDU in Switzerland), Pirates parties, short-lived parties and smaller lists 
that are commonly classified under “others” in official election results. The detailed classification is available from the 
authors. 
4 When attributing the social-liberal parties of Northern Europe to a party pole, we considered their tendency to be natural 
coalition partners of either the left or the centre-right. Therefore, we allocated the Dutch D66 and the Danish Radikale 
Venstre to the left, because those two parties were more often in governmental coalitions with the left than with the 
centre-right. In contrast, Venstre in Norway participated more often in right-wing coalitions, so we classified it in the 
centre-right. 
5 As presidential elections are of greater relevance than parliamentary elections in France’s semi-presidential regime, we 
select the question about which candidate the respondent voted for in the last presidential election in France. 
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engineers, IT specialists and technicians; (3) socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals such 
as doctors, teachers and social workers. Two other classes form the working class: (4) production 
workers such as mechanics, assemblers and carpenters; (5) service workers such as waiters, shop 
assistants and nursing aides. Another class is in the twilight zone between the middle and working 
class: (6) clerks such as secretaries, postal clerks and receptionists. Finally, we distinguish two classes 
of the self-employed: (7) large employers and liberal professionals such as self-employed lawyers and 
dentists; (8) small business owners such as shop owners, independent artisans and farmers.  
Respondents to the ESS are allocated to one of these 8 classes based on their current or, if 
missing, past job. We thus also attribute a class location to the unemployed, retired or economically 
inactive. We argue that an unemployed lawyer still faces different life chances than an unemployed 
assembler, as is the case of a retired medical doctor compared to a retired textile worker. Our class 
measure is based on three sets of information: on employment status (separating employers and the 
self-employed from employees), on the number of employees (separating large employers with 9 and 
more employees from small business owners with 0 to 8 employees) and, most importantly, on 
detailed occupation (based on ISCO 4-digit).6  
Alongside the class variable, we construct two indicators to capture citizens’ preferences on 
the economic-distributive and cultural-identitarian axes. For the economic axis, we use the only 
question about economic preferences that has been asked in all seven ESS rounds: “government 
should reduce differences in income levels”.7 This question was answered on an ordinal 5-point scale 
(from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”) which we standardized between 0 and 1. For the 
cultural axis, we use three questions regarding immigration (“cultural life is undermined or enriched 
by immigrants”), the European Union (“European unification should go further or has gone too far”) 
and cultural liberalism (“gays are free to live as they wish”).8 Again, we standardize the answers 
(given on an 11-point scale or 5-point scale for the item on cultural liberalism) between 0 and 1 and 
calculate each voter’s position on the cultural axis as his or her average value on these three 
questions.9  
 
 
Class voting for the Left, Centre-Right and Radical Right 
We scrutinize the class basis of the three party poles’ electorate in Figure 3 by showing for each class 
the deviation from the party pole’s mean score; horizontal bars to the left thus imply below-average 
electoral support, and bars to the right above-average support. Our data confirm the presence of two 
party preserves. The first preserve comprises socio-cultural professionals who lend disproportionate 
support to the Left. 54 per cent of this growing class voted for the Left – as compared to 35 per cent 
for the Centre-Right and only 7 per cent for the Radical Right. If it were only for socio-cultural 
professionals, the Radical Right would be condemned to an irrelevant minority status.  
The second party preserve comprises capital owners and their agents: large employers and 
self-employed professionals, small business owners and managers. The Centre-Right is particularly 
successful among large employers and self-employed professionals among whom it obtains 56 per 
                                                      
6 For more detail on the concept and measurement of the class variable, see Oesch (2006: 270-2). The script used for the 
construction of this class schema can be downloaded in Stata or SPSS from the webpage of one of the authors: 
http://people.unil.ch/danieloesch/scripts 
7 As a robustness check, we use the ESS rounds 2002 and 2008 and measure the economic axis with an additional item. In 
2002, this item is: “employees need strong trade unions to protect working conditions”; in 2008: “jobs for everyone is 
government’s responsibility”. The resulting configuration of voters’ attitudes by class and parties looks very similar to 
the pattern observed with only one item.  
8 The item on the EU is not available in rounds 1 and 5. In these two rounds, the cultural axis is based solely on the items 
relative to immigration and cultural liberalism.  
9 A principal component analysis of the four items confirms that the question on differences in income levels loads heavily on 
a first component, whereas the three other items all load on a second component. Together, these two components explain 
63 per cent of variance in the four attitudinal variables (see table A.4 in the appendix).  
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cent of all votes – twice as much as the Left and four times as much as the Radical Right. The Centre-
Right also holds greatest appeal among small business owners. The competition for this class is clearly 
in favour of the Centre-Right (53 per cent of all votes), although small business owners also lend 
disproportionate support to the Radical Right (23 per cent), thus preferring it over the Left (21 per 
cent).  
Our hypothesis of a contested stronghold applies better to the working class – production and 
service workers – than to small business owners. While the Centre-Right makes its lowest score 
among production and service workers, the Radical Right is most successful among these same two 
classes with 31 and 23 per cent respectively. Were it only for production workers, the Radical Right 
would be much stronger, with almost a third of the electorate. It thus clearly challenges the Left for the 
allegiance of the working class. If we do not control for country and year, production workers are no 
more likely than the average voter to support the Left (38 per cent) – and service workers only slightly 
more likely (42 per cent). 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
The different class profiles of our three party poles emerge more clearly when we adopt a 
compositional perspective and disaggregate each pole’s electorate according to class (see Figure A.1 
in the appendix). The Radical Right depends strongly on the working-class vote. Half of its voters are 
either production or service workers – as compared to a third of the Left’s electorate and a quarter of 
the Centre-Right’s electorate. The Left compensates its waning stronghold among working-class 
voters with success among socio-cultural professionals, who make up 21 per cent of its electorate – as 
compared to only 6 per cent among Radical Right voters. The Centre-Right in turn relies less on the 
working class and socio-cultural professionals, but draws its strength from large employers and liberal 
professionals, managers and small business owners. Together, these entrepreneurial classes constitute 
almost 40 per cent of its electorate – as compared to 24 per cent of the Left and 26 per cent of the 
Radical Right. Contrary to our expectation, small business owners do not weigh heavily within the 
Radical Right’s electorate. They make up only 12 per cent – and therefore less than in the electorate of 
the Centre-Right (14 per cent), but more than in that of the Left (6 per cent).  
Our argument about class voting in the tripolar political space has a temporal dimension: We 
expect the realignment between classes and party poles to be triggered by the rise of the Radical Right. 
Finland and Sweden allow us to test this argument as our data cover both an election without a tripolar 
configuration (when the Radical Right was still irrelevant) and with a tripolar configuration (when the 
Radical Right made its breakthrough). In Finland, the Radical Right increased its voting share fourfold 
from 4 to 19 per cent between the elections of 2007 and 2011. In Sweden, it doubled its share from 6 
to 13 per cent between the elections of 2010 and 2014.   
Figure 4 shows the difference in party support by class before and after the emergence of a 
tripolar political space. In both countries, the Radical Right made its largest gains among production 
workers (+26 percentage points in Finland, +18 in Sweden), followed by small employers (+18 points 
in Finland, +11 in Sweden). For the Left, the rise of the Radical Right meant heavy electoral losses 
among production workers (-19 points in Finland, -8 in Sweden) and moderate losses among service 
workers and clerks. While the Radical Right strongly challenged the Left over the working-class vote, 
it had no impact on support for the Left among socio-cultural professionals. This support remained 
(almost) stable in Finland and increased strongly in Sweden (by 15 points). With the emergence of a 
tripolar configuration, the Centre-Right lost out most clearly among small business owners in Finland 
(-15 points) and large employers and self-employed professionals in Sweden (-23 points).  
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
 
The economic and cultural attitudes linking classes with party poles 
We expect different class positions to go along with different sets of attitudes – and these attitudes 
should pick up the class effect and translate it into party choice. Based on the issues discussed above, 
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we plot voters’ preferences on the economic and cultural axes into the two-dimensional political space 
shown in Figure 5. Although we aggregate voters’ preferences at the level of both classes and party 
poles, our analysis relates only to the electoral demand-side: The location of a given party poles 
reflects the mean positions of their voters on economic and cultural issues. 
At the level of party poles, we observe the triangular configuration found by other scholars 
(e.g. Kriesi et al., 2008; Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). Voters of the Centre-Right are close to 
the median voter in terms of cultural preferences, but hold distinctly market-liberal economic attitudes. 
Voters of the Radical Right are economically more centrist than those of the Centre-Right, but take a 
more right-wing stance over cultural issues and cluster at the bottom end of the cultural-preference 
axis. Voters of the Left stand out in terms both of their socialist attitudes on the economic axis and 
their libertarian attitudes on the cultural axis. Economically, they are at greatest variance from the 
voters of the Centre-Right. Culturally, they differ most from the voters of the Radical Right.  
At the level of classes, socio-cultural professionals are particularly libertarian. Although they 
also take a more leftist stance over economic issues, what clearly sets them apart is their cultural 
libertarianism. The opposite – traditional – end of the cultural axis is occupied by small business 
owners and, above all, production workers. While these two classes share similar cultural attitudes, 
they diverge on economic preferences. Small business owners are more market-liberal – and in this 
respect more similar to the electorate of the Centre-Right –, whereas production workers hold more 
leftist economic attitudes.  
These results on attitudes suggest that the three party poles compete most fiercely over three 
class segments. First, the Left and the Radical Right compete for the working class; depending on 
whether economic or cultural issues are more salient, production and service workers either choose the 
Left or the Radical Right. Second, the Left and the Centre-Right compete for the salaried middle class 
– managers and technical specialists –, and this conflict mainly concerns the economic dimension. 
Third, the Centre-Right and the Radical Right compete for small business owners, and this conflict 
relates to the cultural dimension.  
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
To what extent do economic and cultural preferences account for the class differences in party choice? 
We examine this question by estimating multinomial regressions on the determinants of voting for one 
of the three party poles (see Table 1). Resorting to a multivariate model also allows us to test whether 
the link between classes and party poles holds once we account for other determinants of voting such 
as gender, age, education, the place of residence (city, town, suburb, village) as well as for country and 
year (ESS round). We present the results as marginal effects and choose clerks as the reference 
category because they are close to the median voter (see Figure 5).  
The first model M1 simply presents the class effect on party choice, net of the influence of all 
the control variables. The results lead us to the same conclusions as did the descriptive evidence 
shown above. The Radical Right draws largest support from production workers and small business 
owners, but is least successful among socio-cultural professionals and managers. Compared to the 
reference category of clerks, the Left is more successful among production workers, service workers 
and, above all, socio-cultural professionals, but holds less appeal among managers, large employers 
and small business owners. The Centre-Right presents the mirror image of the Left, losing out among 
working-class voters and socio-cultural professionals, but receiving strong support from small 
business owners, large employers and managers. For both the Left and the Centre-Right, marginal 
effects are not only statistically significant, but for three classes exceed 10 percentage points and are 
thus substantial.  
If we run a separate regression for each country, the same configuration between classes and 
parties emerges (see Figure A.2). In seven out of nine countries, the Radical Right is most successful 
among production workers (joined by service workers in several countries) and small business owners 
(joined by large employers in Austria, Norway and Sweden). Only Belgium and, to a smaller extent, 
the Netherlands differ from this pattern – as the Radical Right has a stronger cross-class profile (but 
then we have low numbers of observations for Radical Right voters in these two countries). In eight 
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out of nine countries, the socio-cultural professionals are particularly unlikely to vote for the Radical 
Right, but lend disproportionate support to the Left in six out of nine countries. In Denmark, Finland, 
France and Norway, they are joined by production workers who also strongly support the Left. In 
contrast, large employers, self-employed professionals and small business owners are the weakest 
supporters of the Left in all nine countries, but form everywhere (except in Switzerland) the electoral 
backbone of the Centre-Right. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The introduction of economic attitudes into the second model M2 partly explains why large employers 
and managers dislike the Left and endorse the Centre-Right – the effects become smaller for these 
classes once we account for differences in their economic attitudes. Economic attitudes also explain, 
albeit marginally, why production and service workers disproportionately support the Left and avoid 
the Centre-Right. However, they contribute nothing to the explanation of why production and service 
workers vote for the Radical Right. If we hold economic attitudes constant, the class effect becomes 
even larger for service workers. The Radical Right gains the support of the working class not thanks to 
its free-market programme, but despite it (Ivarsflaten, 2005; Oesch, 2008b). 
Introducing cultural attitudes in a third model M3 changes nothing in the case of voters of the 
Centre-Right. Clearly, it is voters’ economic preferences – and not their cultural attitudes – that 
explain the differential support among classes for the Centre-Right. In contrast, conflict on cultural 
attitudes is decisive for the Radical Right. The class effect of production and service workers is almost 
halved if we hold cultural preferences constant – and becomes insignificant in the case of small 
business owners. For the Left, cultural attitudes mediate the class effect to a smaller effect than 
economic attitudes. If we keep cultural attitudes constant, production and service workers become 
more likely – and managers less likely – to vote for the Left. In other words, the working class 
supports the Left despite its culturally libertarian programme (see also Lefkofridi et al. 2013).  
When introducing both economic and cultural preferences in a last model M4, we find that 
attitudes pick up the class effect only to a small extent. However, preferences go in the expected 
direction. While both dimensions – economic and cultural – matter for voters of the Left, voters of the 
Centre-Right primarily vary from other voters by holding more liberal attitudes on the economy, 
whereas voters of the Radical Right primarily vary by holding more culturally traditional attitudes.  
In a last analysis, we illustrate how attitudes affect party choice by plotting the predicted 
probabilities of a mid-aged male production worker voting for either one of the three poles, depending 
on his economic and cultural attitudes. If we set cultural attitudes at the average value and only vary 
economic attitudes (Figure 6, Left-hand panel), we find that the Left dominates among production 
workers strongly favouring redistribution, whereas the Centre-Right makes important inroads among 
production workers strongly opposing redistribution. Voting for the Radical Right varies little and 
remains at a comparatively low level. However, if economic attitudes are held constant at the average 
value and only cultural attitudes vary, we find that the Radical Right receives massive support among 
production workers with traditional attitudes, whereas the Left dominates among production workers 
with libertarian attitudes (Figure 6, right-hand panel). It is now voting for the Centre-Right that varies 
little and remains at a low level.  
These analyses show clearly that the Radical Right successfully competes for the working-
class vote (as for that of small business owners) thanks to cultural conflict, whereas the Centre-Right 
and, to a lesser extent, the Left mobilize along economic conflict lines. This further suggests that the 
old working-class vote for the mainstream Centre-Right parties is different from the new working-
class vote for the Radical Right. Anti-redistributive attitudes drive the former, whereas traditional 
cultural attitudes explain the latter.  
 
Figure 6 about here 
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Conclusion 
The rise of the Radical Right fundamentally changes the face of electoral competition in Western 
Europe as we knew it over much of the post-war period. Bipolar competition is becoming tripolar, as 
the two traditional party poles of the Left and the Centre-Right are challenged by a third pole – the 
Radical Right – in a growing number of countries. The expectation that right-wing populist parties 
would constitute ephemeral protest movements did not materialize. Between 2000 and 2015, the 
Radical Right secured more than 12 per cent of the electorate in over ten Western European countries 
and in over twenty national elections. Moreover, the Radical Right still seems to be in a process of 
expansion in several European countries. This applies in particular to new contenders in Germany 
(AfD) and the United Kingdom (UKIP).  
Our objective was to examine how electoral competition between the three party poles plays 
out at the micro-level of different social classes. For this reason, we presented a model of class voting 
that distinguishes three types of relationship between classes and parties: some classes are one party 
pole’s preserve, other classes are the contested stronghold of two party poles, and over still other 
classes there is an open competition between three party poles.  
Our analysis confirms the hypotheses about the party poles’ preserves. While the Left receives 
disproportionate support among socio-cultural professionals, the Centre-Right dominates among large 
employers, self-employed professionals and managers. Socio-cultural professionals’ attachment to the 
Left owes as much to cultural as to economic preferences. In contrast, the endorsement of the Centre-
Right by employers and their agents is primarily motivated by economic attitudes. With electoral 
shares of 50 per cent, we rightly talk about party preserves in the case of socio-cultural professionals 
on the Left, large employers and managers on the Right.  
If the electoral domination of the old and new middle classes seems largely out of reach for 
the Radical Right, the one notable exception is small business owners – a class that Marxists named, 
somewhat derogatorily, the petite bourgeoisie. While the Radical Right made larger inroads into the 
electorate of small business owners than into any of the other middle-class segments, the electoral 
relevance of small business owners for the Radical Right should not be overestimated. The Centre-
Right still obtains significantly larger voting shares in this class. Moreover, as small business owners 
are not a large socio-demographic group, they do not account for more than 12 per cent of the Radical 
Right’s electorate. 
Our hypothesis of a contested stronghold applies better to the working class: to service 
workers and, most clearly, production workers. The Radical Right receives its highest score in these 
two classes. Were it only for production workers, the Radical Right would come close to a third of the 
national electorate. The Radical Right provides a serious challenge to the Left over its traditional 
working-class stronghold. In terms of economic attitudes, production and service workers are close to 
the Left. Our multivariate analysis confirms that they still lend significantly stronger support to the 
Left than do clerks, technical specialists or managers. However, their cultural preferences are in closer 
accordance with the Radical Right, explaining why the electorate of the Radical Right has the 
strongest working-class bias of the three party poles. Half of its voters are either production or service 
workers – as compared to less than 40 per cent for the Left and less than 30 per cent for the Centre-
Right. 
These contested strongholds attest to the coexistence of old and new patterns of class voting. 
Old patterns, in which party dominance over one class has weakened without disappearing, tend to be 
structured along the economic axis of conflict. Examples are production workers’ support for the Left 
and small business owners’ endorsement of the Centre-Right. In contrast, the emergence of new 
patterns is due to the rise of the Radical Right and mostly structured along the cultural axis of conflict. 
Examples are the affinity of production workers and small business owners for the Radical Right. 
The results from two countries where the Radical Right made its breakthrough during our 
period of observation – Finland and Sweden – suggest that the Radical Right disproportionately owes 
its success to the votes of the two contested strongholds, small business owners and, above all, the 
working class. In contrast, it leaves largely unaffected the preserves of the Left (socio-cultural 
professionals) and Centre-Right (employers and their agents) because these classes do not share the 
Radical Right’s cultural preferences.  
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In the last decades, it has become common in political science to study party competition 
independently from the social divisions that underlie European societies. The process of dealignment 
between social classes and political parties has been interpreted as closing the historical chapter of 
class voting. Our findings suggest that party competition continues to be firmly rooted in the social 
structure – and that we observe the realignment between classes and parties. Each party pole has a 
distinctive social basis, which is the joint outcome of persisting old divisions and the development of 
new contrasts between classes. Moreover, a clearly defined social basis is not the prerogative of the 
smaller pole of the Radical Right, but also applies to the two larger poles of the Left and the Centre-
Right.  
At the same time, political parties cannot rely solely on the mobilization of their party 
preserves to reach electoral majorities. Given the small size of the different classes, parties only obtain 
stable majorities if they succeed in creating new coalitions of voters (e.g. Beramendi et al., 2015). 
With the shrinking of the two traditional party poles and the rise of the Radical Right, the forging of 
stable coalitions will become increasingly difficult in the new tripolar political space.  
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Figure 1: A model of party poles and class-party links in a two-dimensional political space 
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Figure 2: Electoral strength of the three poles 2010-2015 in Western Europe (in %)  
 
Notes: Only countries with a Radical Right pole in at least one election over the entire period 2000-2015, see 
Table A.1 in the appendix. If there was more than one national election over the period 2010-2015, we calculated 
the average scores. The detailed classification of parties is available from the authors.  
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Figure 3: Electoral support for the three poles by social class (in %) 
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Data: ESS, N=43,742. Data weighted.  
The y-axis cuts the x-axis at the mean electoral score over all the classes (39.3% for the Left, 39.0% for the 
Centre-Right, 18.8% for the Radical Right). 
Legend for classes: Serv work=service workers, Prod work=production workers, Clerks=clerks, Socio 
prof=socio-cultural professionals, Tech prof=technical professionals, Manag=managers, Lar/self-emp=large 
employers and self-employed professionals, Small bus=small business owners. The percentages in parentheses 
show the size of each class in the electorate.  
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Figure 4: Difference in party support before and after the emergence of a tripolar 
configuration (in percentage points) 
Finland: 2007, 2011 elections Sweden: 2010, 2014 elections 
  
N Finland: 2007=2527, 2011=2817; N Sweden: 2010=2628, 2014=1412.  
Source: ESS 4-5 and ESS 6-7 in Finland; ESS 5-6 and ESS 7 in Sweden. Data weighted.  
Legend for classes: see under Figure 3.  
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Figure 5: Location of voters in a two-dimensional space – by class and party pole  
 
Data: ESS 2002-2014. N= N=43,833 - 63,028. Data weighted.  
Legend for classes: see under Figure 3.  
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Figure 6: Voting for one of the three party poles (in %) – predicted probabilities for a mid-
aged male production worker, depending on his economic and cultural attitudes 
Economic attitudes Cultural attitudes 
  
Note: Predicted probabilities based on model 4 in Table 1. Vertical bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
Probabilities are calculated for a production worker, male, 35-44 years, upper secondary education, small city, 
with cultural attitudes held at their mean value (Left-hand panel) or economic values held at their mean value 
(right-hand panel). 
 
 
 
  
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
Capitalist .2 .4 .6 .8 Socialist
Left Centre-Right
Radical Right
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
Traditional .2 .4 .6 .8 Libertarian
Left Centre-Right
Radical Right
  
Table 1: Voting for the Left, Centre-Right and Radical Right – marginal effects (with S.E.) based on multinomial logistic regressions  
 M1 
Dem. 
M2 
+eco 
M3 
+cult 
M4+eco 
+cult 
M1 
Dem. 
M2 
+eco 
M3 
+cult 
M4+eco 
+cult 
M1 
Dem. 
M2 
+eco 
M3 
+cult 
M4+eco 
+cult 
 LEFT CENTRE-RIGHT RADICAL RIGHT 
Social class (ref. clerks)             
Service workers 0.04** 0.03** 0.06** 0.05** -0.08** -0.07** -0.08** -0.07** 0.03** 0.04** 0.02** 0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Prod workers 0.05** 0.04** 0.09** 0.07** -0.12** -0.11** -0.13** -0.12** 0.07** 0.07** 0.04** 0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Socio-cultural prof. 0.13** 0.12** 0.12** 0.11** -0.05* -0.03* -0.04* -0.03 -0.09** -0.09** -0.08** -0.08** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Technical specialists 0.00 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Managers -0.03* -0.01 -0.05* -0.02 0.07** 0.05** 0.07** 0.05** -0.04** -0.04** -0.03** -0.03** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Large empl./Self-em. -0.10** -0.07* -0.12** -0.09** 0.12** 0.10* 0.14** 0.11* -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Small business own. -0.18** -0.17** -0.17** -0.15** 0.14** 0.13** 0.14** 0.13** 0.04* 0.04* 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Pro redistribution  0.49**  0.46**  -0.40**  -0.41**  -0.09**  -0.06** 
  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Pro libertarian   0.81** 0.76**   -0.24** -0.19**   -0.54** -0.55** 
   (0.06) (0.07)   (0.05) (0.05)   (0.04) (0.04) 
Socio-demographic 
controls  
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country and ESS round 
dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
McFadden's R2  0.0654 0.0915 0.1062 0.1289 0.0654 0.0915 0.1062 0.1289 0.0654 0.0915 0.1062 0.1289 
N 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 
 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. Table reports marginal effects using Stata command dmlogit2 based on multinomial regressions with clustered standard errors and dummies for 
country and ESS round. All models include controls for gender, age, education and residence unit (large city, suburb, town, village). Only class and attitudes shown, for the 
full model see Table A.5 in the appendix.  
  
Appendix – Figures 
 
Figure A.1: Class composition of the three poles’ electorate 
 
 
Data: ESS, N=43,742. Data weighted. 
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Figure A.2: Party choice in national elections with a tripolar political space – marginal effects 
for social class by country 
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Note: Figures report the marginal effect of social class relative to the reference category of the clerks on voting 
for the Left, Centre-Right and Radical Right. The calculation is based on multinomial regressions with socio-
demographic controls (gender, age, education and residence unit) and year dummies (as in M1 in Table 1), 
performed separately for each country. Horizontal bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
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Appendix – Tables  
 
Table A.1: Detailed score of parties included in the Radical Right pole in elections 2000-
2015 
 Election 
year 
Party Party name Elections       
 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 
AT 02/06/ 
08/13 
FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 10 11 17.5 20.5     
 BZÖ Bündnis Zukunft Österreich - 4.1 10.7 3.5     
 Total  10 15.1 28.2 24     
BE 03/07/ 
10/14 
VB Vlaams Belang  11,7 12 7,8 3,7     
 FN Front National 2 2 0,5      
           
 Total  13,7 14 8,3 3,7     
DK 01/05/ 
07/11/15 
DF Dansk Folkeparti 12 13.3 13.9 12.3 21.1    
 FrP Fremskridtspartiet 0.6        
 Total  12.6 13.3 13.9 12.3 21.1    
FI 03/07/ 
11/15 
PS Perussuomalaiset 1.6 4.1 19.1 17.6     
FR 02/07/12 FN Front National 16.9 10.4 17.9      
 MNR Mouvement national républicain 2.3 - -      
 Total  19.2 10.4 17.9      
DE 02/05/ 
09/13 
REP Die Republikaner 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.2     
 NPD Nationaldemokratische Partei 
Deutschland 0.4 1.6 1.5 1.3 
    
 AfD Alternative für Deutschland - - - 4.7     
 Total  1 2.2 1.9 6.2     
GR 00/04/ 
07/09/ 
12a+b/ 
15a+b 
LAOS Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós - 2.2 3.8 5.6 2.9 1.6 1 - 
 ANEL Anexartitoi Ellines - - - - 10.6 7.5 4.8 3.7 
 GD Chrysi Avgi - - - 0.3 7 6.9 6.3 7 
 Total  0 2.2 3.8 5.9 20.5 16 12.1 10.7 
IT 01/06/ 
08/13 
LN Lega Nord 3.9 4.6 8.3 4.1     
LU 03/09/13 ADR Alternativ Demokratesch 
Reformpartei 
10 8.1 6.8      
NL 02/03/ 
06/10/12 
PVV Partij Voor de Vrijheid - - 5.9 15.4 10.1    
 LPF Lijst Pim Fortuyn 17 5.7 0.2 - -    
 Total  17 5.7 6.1 15.4 10.1    
NO 01/05/ 
09/13 
FrP Fremskrittspartiet 14.6 22.1 22.9 16.3     
PT 02/05/ 
09/11/15 
PNR Partido Nacional Renovador 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5    
ES 00/02/ 
04/08/ 
11/15 
E-2000 España 2000 - - - 0 0 -   
 DN Democracia Nacional 0 - 0.1 0 0 0   
 Total  0 0 0.1 0 0 0   
SE 02/06/ 
10/14 
SD Sverigedemokraterna 1.4 2.9 5.7 12.9     
CH 03/07/ 
11/15 
SVP Schweizerische Volkspartei 26.7 28.9 26.6 29.4     
 Lega Lega dei Ticinesi 0.3 0.6 0.8 1     
 MCG Mouvement citoyen genevois - 0.1 0.4 0.3     
 SD Schweizer Demokraten 1 0.5 0.2 0.1     
 FPS Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz 0.2 0.1 - -     
 Total  28.2 30.2 28 30.8     
UK 01/05/ 
10/15 
UKIP UK Independance Party 1.5 2.2 3.1 12.6     
 BNP British National Party 0.2 0.7 1.9 0     
 NF National Front 0 0 0 0     
 DUP Democratic Unionist Party 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.6     
 Total  2.4 3.8 5.6 13.2     
Note: The score is 0 when a party reaches less than 0.1% of the vote. 
  
Table A.2: Strength of the Radical Right pole in legislative elections 2000-2015  
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Notes: Table A.1 provides detailed information on the parties included in the Radical Right pole. In France, the scores are based on the first round of the presidential election. 
In Greece, the second election of 2012 (June, after the first election in May) is indicated under 2013. For 2015, the second election (September, after the first election in 
January) is indicated in the last column. Source for the electoral results: Election Resources on the Internet: Western Europe, Manuel Álvarez-Rivera, 
http://electionresources.org/western.europe.html, supplemented by Wikipedia. 
 
  
Table A.3: The 8-class schema – with three typical occupations in each class 
Interpersonal service 
logic 
Technical work logic Organizational work 
logic 
Independent work logic 
Socio-cultural (semi-) 
professionals 
Technical (semi-) 
professionals (Associate) managers 
Liberal professionals 
and large employers 
Medical doctors 
Teachers 
Social workers 
Engineers 
Architects 
IT-specialists 
Administrators 
Consultants 
Accountants 
Entrepreneurs 
Lawyers 
Dentists 
Service workers Production workers Office clerks Small business owners 
and farmers  
Waiters 
Nursing aides 
Shop assistants 
Mechanics 
Carpenters 
Assemblers 
Secretaries 
Receptionists 
Mail clerks 
Shop owners 
Independent artisans 
Farmers 
 
  
  
Table A.4: Parameter estimates of exploratory principal component analysis (PCA) 
 Component 1 Component 2 
Redistribution 0.92 0.03 
Immigration -0.02 0.65 
Europe 0.23 0.60 
Cultural liberalism -0.33 0.47 
  
 
Eigenvalue 1.03 1.48 
R2 25.8% 36.9% 
Data: European Social Survey, 38 country-rounds  
Results of PCA with Varimax rotation. Factor loadings above 0.40 are printed in bold. 
 
 
  
Table A.5: Voting for the Left, Centre-Right and Radical Right – marginal effects (with S.E.) based on multinomial logistic regressions (full model) 
 M1  
Dem. 
M2a  
+eco 
M2b  
+cult 
M3+eco 
+cult 
M1  
Dem. 
M2a  
+eco 
M2b  
+cult 
M3+eco 
+cult 
M1  
Dem. 
M2a  
+eco 
M2b  
+cult 
M3+eco 
+cult 
 LEFT CENTRE-RIGHT RADICAL RIGHT 
Female 0.05** 0.03** 0.03** 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.04** -0.04** -0.03** -0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age (ref. 35-44)             
15-24 -0.00 0.01 -0.03** -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
25-34 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** 0.02 0.02 0.02** 0.02** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
45-54 0.06** 0.05** 0.06** 0.06** -0.04** -0.04** -0.05** -0.04** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01* -0.01* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
55-64 0.04** 0.03** 0.06** 0.04** -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02* -0.02 -0.03** -0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
65-74 -0.03 -0.05** 0.01 -0.01 0.06* 0.08** 0.05 0.07** -0.03 -0.03 -0.05* -0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
75+ -0.03 -0.04* 0.02 0.01 0.07** 0.08** 0.06* 0.07** -0.04 -0.04 -0.07** -0.07** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Education (ref. upper secondary)            
Lower secondary or less 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03* -0.02 -0.03* -0.02 0.03** 0.03** 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Post secondary 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Tertiary 0.05** 0.07** 0.01 0.03* 0.07** 0.05** 0.08** 0.06** -0.11** -0.12** -0.08** -0.09** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Social class (ref. clerks)             
Service workers 0.04** 0.03** 0.06** 0.05** -0.08** -0.07** -0.08** -0.07** 0.03** 0.04** 0.02** 0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Prod workers 0.05** 0.04** 0.09** 0.07** -0.12** -0.11** -0.13** -0.12** 0.07** 0.07** 0.04** 0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Socio-cultural prof. 0.13** 0.12** 0.12** 0.11** -0.05* -0.03* -0.04* -0.03 -0.09** -0.09** -0.08** -0.08** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Technical specialists 0.00 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Managers -0.03* -0.01 -0.05* -0.02 0.07** 0.05** 0.07** 0.05** -0.04** -0.04** -0.03** -0.03** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  
  
Large empl./Self-em. -0.10** -0.07* -0.12** -0.09** 0.12** 0.10* 0.14** 0.11* -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Small business own. -0.18** -0.17** -0.17** -0.15** 0.14** 0.13** 0.14** 0.13** 0.04* 0.04* 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Residence (ref. small city)            
Big city 0.07** 0.07** 0.05* 0.05** -0.05* -0.05** -0.05* -0.05* -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Suburbs/outskirts -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01* 0.01* 0.02** 0.02** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Village/Countryside -0.08** -0.08** -0.07** -0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Pro redistribution  0.49**  0.46**  -0.40**  -0.41**  -0.09**  -0.06** 
  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Pro libertarian   0.81** 0.76**   -0.24** -0.19**   -0.54** -0.55** 
   (0.06) (0.07)   (0.05) (0.05)   (0.04) (0.04) 
Country and ESS round 
dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
McFadden's R2  0.0654 0.0915 0.1062 0.1289 0.0654 0.0915 0.1062 0.1289 0.0654 0.0915 0.1062 0.1289 
N 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 42,047 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01. Table reports marginal effects using Stata command dmlogit2 based on multinomial regressions with clustered standard errors and dummies for 
country and ESS round (not shown). 
